

### ***The Supersensible Substrate as a Clue to Understanding the Necessity of Spirit as the Animating Principle in the Mind***

At the beginning of the CJ Kant states that the subject can have a feeling of itself, in the manner of a representation stimulated by various kinds of objects: objects of nature and two kinds of artefacts, objects of decorative forms (e.g. wallpapers) and (beautiful) art. After the exposition, Kant focuses on the difference between two of the three kinds: the beauty of nature and the beautiful art. In the face of both types kinds the subject can feel itself — and yet, the second kind is in the need of an additional principle in addition to the formal aspect that both kinds have in common: spirit as the animating principle in the mind.

In my talk I will argue that for understanding the notion of animation as mentioned in § 49 ›The faculties of the mind which constitute genius‹ it is crucial to understand the role of the supersensible substrate. The starting point of my talk will be the last passage of the ›Remark I‹ (CJ 344). In this passage Kant interlinks the concepts of genius and the notion of aesthetic ideas with the supersensible substrate and the Intelligible of our nature. By following these links, we can understand the systematic function of the animating principle.

The last passage of the ›Remark I‹ and the links mentioned are not self-explanatory. To understand the systematic function of the supersensible substrate it is necessary to take a broader view: to look at the architectural layout of the §§ 30-59. A major turning point in the Kantian line of thought is the transition between § 42 ›The intellectual interest in the beautiful‹ and § 43 ›Art in general‹. In § 42 Kant shows that the subsequent interest in the beautiful, the intellectual interest, arises from another kind of interest: our reason is interested in (moral) ideas having objective reality. The beautiful is at least a hint at that hoping for the interest of having objective reality is not an obvious illusion. In the light of this account, Kant shows that a mere artificial illusion lacks the link between the two interests and in virtue of that, I would add, the hint of hope. This is not the best starting point for discussing beautiful art, with which Kant now begins.

I will argue that the aesthetic ideas which, as the mentioned passage indicates, are interlinked with the supersensible substrate are an *artificial* substitute for the *natural* link between the two interests: the intellectual interests in the beautiful, the interest in ideas having objective reality. On the basis of this assumption we can gain a first understanding why the animating principle is necessary and what its systematic function is.