Kant's pleasure in the beautiful: from feeling of life to common sense

In the article "Kant's leading thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful", Beatrice Longuenesse briefly puts forward the insightful claim that Kant's definition of the pleasure in the beautiful as a feeling of life can be conceived similarly to the life of the Hegelian "spirit", namely as the "life of the universal community of human minds." (Longuenesse 2006, p. 200). My paper proposal is motivated by the reading suggestion sketched by Longuenesse and attempts to substantiate it by articulating the specificity of the pleasure in the beautiful from its first association with the feeling of life to its last characterization as an instantiation of common sense. More specifically, my paper shows that such a feeling of pleasure bears a genuine intersubjective scope, crucial to explain how the idea of a universal community of judging subjects, as it is also often referred to, can derive from Kant's account of pleasure in the beautiful.

To do this, I will divide the paper into two main parts. I will first reconstruct Kant's specification of pleasure in the beautiful throughout the Analytic. In particular, I will focus on the universal character of such a pleasure and on its being the result of the notorious free play of imagination and understanding. From this reconstruction, it will emerge a more determined account of the first definition of pleasure in the beautiful as a feeling of life, namely as referring to the life of our mental capacities, of which we are conscious only aesthetically (Longuenesse 2006, Berger 2021, Choi and Cohen 2021). In the second part, by analyzing Kant's introduction of the sensus communis aestheticus. I will elaborate on the intersubjective validity of judgments of taste and the notion of the aesthetic community. In this respect, I will claim that the latter can only be partially derived from the universally pleasurable intrasubjective agreement of the faculties on which judgments of taste rest. As a result, the interpretation of pleasure in terms of "the life of the universal community of human minds" should leave at least some room for the ideal status entailed by the notion of the Kantian aesthetic community. In this sense, according to Kant, beauty can indeed be conceived as promoting life as it animates our mental faculties in a way which makes us feel in harmony with ourselves as embodied rational beings (Choi and Cohen 2021). Furthermore, through this very association with the feeling of life, beauty motivates the pursuit of an ideal "unanimity in the manner of sensing" (KU 5:240) and it ultimately promotes our sociability.