

Lebensgefühl and Lebenskraft: the vital feeling and the vital force between aesthetic consideration and evaluative meaning.

The goal of my paper will be to define the relation between practical and aesthetic pleasure, starting from the connection between *Lebenskraft* and *Lebensgefühl*, to establish a link between the vital force and the vital animation, and to consider an evaluative meaning of pleasure. First of all, I will specify the presence of pleasant intensification in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, connected to private, subjective, and singular pleasure. In the case of sensible pleasure, there is an activity of revitalization and animation of the entire lower desire faculty, starting from the consideration of the material determination of the will and the conception of a vital force [*Lebenskraft*]. In this sense, I will try to analyze how the subject discriminates and chooses the various objects of desire through sensible pleasure, starting from the impulse and force of the singular representations on the vital force [*Lebenskraft*], i.e. that ability that differentiates representations only by their degree and intensity. Secondly, I will explain the concept of an aesthetic vital animation in the *Critique of Judgment*, linked to a vivification of the overall state of the subject about the free play of understanding and imagination. In this sense, I will focus on the vital feeling [*Lebensgefühl*], understood as an aesthetic feeling that cannot be reduced to a state of private pleasure connected to individual psychological content but has a formal nature and a universally communicable principle. Then, I will show that if the vital force [*Lebenskraft*] concerns that feeling of activation of the faculty of desire about objects, to reproduce, maintain or realize them again, the vital feeling [*Lebensgefühl*] is a pleasure that emerges from the overall life of the soul, as the sentimental effect of the functioning of the faculties of the mind taken as a whole and in their synergistic activity. Within this relationship, I will identify different relations of pleasure with its representative contents: in practical pleasure, we have a discrimination of contents linked to a choice given the production of objects; in contemplative pleasure a discernment of objects linked to the subject and his feeling; finally, in the judgments on what is pleasant, there is a distinction of the objects that detects their sensorial properties and, subsequently, provides an appreciative evaluation. The final question that will arise from my discussion will be whether, and how, it is possible to speak of a pleasure generally understood as an "activity" that can thus also include the aspects of divergence between aesthetic and moral pleasure.