

Judging of an Object as a Feeling Subject

On the Relation of Cognitive to Aesthetic Judgment in Kant

In the beginning of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant claims that in an *aesthetic judgment* to the effect that an object is beautiful (or not) "the representation is referred entirely to the subject, namely to its feeling of life under the name of pleasure and displeasure" (5: 204, §1), thereby contrasting it with a *logical* or *cognitive judgment* in which "representations [...] are referred to the object in judgment" (ibid.). At the same time, he notes that he has sought the four essential moments of such an aesthetic judgment "guided by the logical functions of judgment" (5: 203n., §1), i.e., guided by exactly those functions that constitute cognitive judgments in which concepts are truly or falsely referred to objects. He thus holds that there is, on the one hand, a *fundamental difference* between an aesthetic and a logical judgment in that an aesthetic judgment is only about *the judging subject*, or about how that subject feels her own life through pleasure and displeasure, while a logical judgment, in contrast, is about *the object of the judgment* as it is exactly independent and distinct from the judging subject; and he holds that there is, on the other hand, a *fundamental commonality* between an aesthetic and a logical judgment in that the constitutive moments of an aesthetic judgment in some sense have to correspond to the constitutive functions of a logical or cognitive judgment.

In my talk, I will try to more precisely understand this complex relationship between aesthetic and logical judgments, namely, how exactly they differ and what exactly they share. In the first half of my talk, I begin by presenting how Kant, in the 'Analytic of Concepts' in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, arrives at Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality as the four fundamental headings of the table of logical functions of judgment starting from the idea and through an analysis of what he calls a "cognition through concepts" (A68/B93, A69/B94), by which he understands a reference of general concepts to individual objects that results in a true or false judgment. In the second half, and against this background, I try to understand how Kant, in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful', arrives at the four moments of an aesthetic judgment starting from the idea that in such a judgment "we refer the representation not [...] to the object for cognition, but rather [...] to the subject and her feeling of pleasure or displeasure" (5: 203, §1), and guided by the four fundamental logical functions of any cognitive judgment. To this end, I will go through the four moments of an aesthetic judgment and try to make intelligible

for each of them how *an interpretation of the respective logical function in relation only to the subject and the way she feels herself* yields the corresponding moment of an aesthetic judgment.